Introduction
Artifact metrics [1] , also called physical unclonable functions (PUF) [2] , utilize the unique physical properties of individual objects for authentication and clone resistance purposes in information security applications. These include electromagnetic [3] , mechanical, and optical properties [4] associated with the objects such as ordinary paper [5] , paper containing magnetic microfibers [6] , plastics, and semiconductor chips. Matsumoto et al. demonstrates nano-artifact metrics that exploits physically uncontrollable processes occurring at the nanometer-scale, which are well beyond the scope of nanostructure technologies, in order to protect against increasing security attacks [7] . Versatile, nanoscale morphological patterns formed on the surfaces of planar silicon devices are one of the most unique and useful vehicles for nano-artifact metrics. This study investigates morphological diversity in silicon random nanostructures based on the eigenanalysis approach.
In particular, we utilize the random collapse of resists induced by exposure to electronbeam (e-beam) lithography [7] . Resist collapse may occur during the rinse process of lithography, and depends on the pattern resolution, resist thickness, and duration of e-beam exposure [8] . The result is the collapse of the intended pattern and production of versatile morphological patterns with minimum dimensions smaller than the resolutions of nanofabrication technologies [7] . The basic performance for security applications was clarified in Ref. [7] by quantitatively evaluating the false-match rate (FMR) for verifying identities, the false non-match rate (FNMR) for characterizing the stability of measurements, and the clone-match rate for evaluating the difficulties in making clones.
However, the technology's potential is not completely known yet, especially in terms of the number of different devices or identities that could be distinguished based on the nanoscale morphological patterns. This is especially important in view of future applications such as document security [9] and Internet-of-Things (IoT) [10] , where securing identities of massive number of devices is critical. In this study, we demonstrate eigenanalysis of experimentally fabricated silicon random nanostructures, through which the diversity and the potential capacity of identities are quantitatively characterized. Our eigenspace-based approach provides intuitive physical pictures and quantitative discussions regarding the morphological diversity of nanostructured devices while uniting measurement stability, which is one of the important concerns for security applications.
Experimental devices
First, we review the experimental random nanostructured devices analyzed in this study. We fabricated an array of resist pillars with a 60 nm  60 nm  200 nm cross-sectional area on a grid of 120 nm  120 nm squares that filled a 2 m  2 m square, as shown in figure 1(a) . We used an e-beam lithography system (JEOL JBX-9300FS) with a 100-kV acceleration voltage. In the rinse process, the random collapse of resist pillars was induced as shown in the scanning electron microscope (SEM) image in figure 1 (256 levels). Versatile morphologies were observed, and the structural detail of the patterns (figure 1(c)) is as small as 9.23 nm [7] .
Results and discussions
We examine experimentally observed structural diversity based on the following eigenspacebased principle. An 8-bit (256 levels) greyscale image of size 128  128 pixels was extracted from around the center of a pillar array image and smoothed using an 11  11 median filter.
Here, one pixel occupies an area of approximately 3.3 nm side-length; therefore, the area of a single image is about 0.18 m 2 . We denote an image by a vector i
x , which has P = 128  128 elements. All the images or the total sets of devices are summarized by a matrix
where N is the number of devices, which is 2383 in the present study. Let the mean values of all images be given by
The covariance matrix is given by
where T indicates the matrix transpose and ( ) Z  μ implies subtracting the vector μ from each column of matrix Z. By solving the eigenequation
we derive the eigenvalues k  and the eigenvectors k s . We set the index k so that the eigenvalues are arranged in descending order. Such an eigendecomposition approach in 
meaning that ( )
represents i x in the eigenspace.
Here, an identical device can be observed in a slightly different manner depending on the observation conditions, which are affected by the misalignment or other reasons. Such fluctuations in measurements should be tolerated in order to ensure measurement stability, which is an important concern in view of security applications [7] . We quantify these fluctuations in measurements in the eigenspace as follows. Multiple measurements were performed for each of the 67 types of devices. Each measurement, for a certain identical device is denoted by i m
, where K is the number of measurements. The measurement i m is represented in the eigenspace by
The measurement i m is represented in the eigenspace by
are represented in the eigenspace by equation (5) .
The similarity between ( ) i

M and ( ) j
X is characterized by the inner product given by
which should be maximum when j is the designated identity that ( ) i M belongs to. In equation (7), L denotes the number of eigenvectors considered while evaluating similarity. If L is too small, similarity does not provide an accurate classification; we quantify the minimum dimensions in identifying individual devices without errors. The ratio of inadequate classification or equivalent FNMR is evaluated for all 67 devices as a function of the dimension (L). Figure   3 
which represents the deviation of 
Conclusion
In summary, we demonstrate the eigenanalysis of morphological fluctuations in silicon 
